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THE BRAWNER RULE-NEW LYRICS
FOR AN OLD TUNE
RICHARD C. ALLEN*
Durham-McDonald is not significantly different in substantive content
from the A.L.I. test. . . . As we have already pointed out, we did not
adopt the new rule in the contemplation that it would affect a signifi-
cant number of verdicts.
From Judge Leventhal's majority opinion in
United States v. Brawner'
[O1n the whole I fear that the change made by the Court today is pri-
marily one of form rather than of substance. . . . What should by
now be clear is that the problems of the responsibility defense cannot
be resolved by adopting for the standard or for the jury instruction any
new formulation of words.
From Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in
United States v. Brawner2
THE "BRAWNER RULE"
The author attended a state bar association dinner some years ago,
at which a distinguished member of the bar was being honored on the
fiftieth anniversary of his entry into practice (after a half century of
doing something, you are generally called "distinguished" whether you
really are or not). After the ceremonies, a reporter commented to
him: "I imagine you have seen a great many changes in the law in your
fifty years of practice"; to which the venerable counselor is said to have
replied: "Yep, and I've opposed every damn one of 'em!"
Whatever may be said of the "insanity" rule of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (and a great deal
has been!), it must be agreed that it has not been static. The develop-
mental chronology has gone something like this:
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Criminology,
The George Washington University School of Law, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1948, J.D.,
1950. Washington University; LL.M., 1963, University of Michigan.
1, 471 F.2d 969, 1005 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. Id. at 1010, 1039.
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1882-M'Naghten "right and wrong" rule adopted 3
1929--"irresistible impulse" added4
1954-birth of the famous (or infamous) "product" rule in Durham v.
United States5
1957--Carter v. United States6 made the rule a sine qua non test
1962-McDonald v. United States7 defined "mental disease or defect"
as an abnormal condition of the mind which substantially im-
pairs behavioral controls
1967-Washington v. United States8 made both parts of the test essen-
tially "legal" rather than strictly "medical" issues
1972-in United States v. Brawner,9 the court adopted the ALI rule plus
"diminished responsibility"
Similarly, peripheral issues, like burden of proof and mandatory
commitment following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
have pursued an on-again-off-again course throughout the history of
3. United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498 (1882).
4. Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
5. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect").
6. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
8. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The statement of the ALI rule adopted in
Brawner is: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law." Id. at 973. The "diminished responsibility" rule adopted in Brawner is: "Even
when there is no defense of insanity, expert testimony of abnormal mental condition will
be admissible when it bears on the existence of a specific mental element necessary
for a crime, as in the issue of premeditation in first degree murder, provided the judge
determines that the testimony is grounded in sufficient scientific support, and would aid
the jury in reaching a decision on the ultimate issues." Id. at 972.
In connection with the statement, first above, of the AL rule, it should be noted
that the court expressly retained the definition of "mental disease or defect" adopted
in McDonald--"A mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the
mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially af-
fects behavior controls"--and that the caveats of Washington still apply, with the ex-
ception that the expert will now be permitted to testify as to whether or not there is
a causal relationship between the defendant's mental disease or defect and his capacity
to "appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law." The second paragraph of the ALI rule, as it appears in section
4.01 of the Model Penal Code ("The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct."),
is adopted "as a rule for application by the judge, to avoid miscarriage of justice, but
not for inclusion in instructions to the jury." Id. at 994.
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the insanity rule (the most recent development in these issues being
the "product of' Congress, via the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 197010).
Unlike the practitioner referred to in the first paragraph, the author
has not "opposed every damn one" of these changes. In fact, he
believes that Durham, with its encouragement of full psychiatric testi-
mony, was a significant improvement over M'Naghten-whose preoc-
cupation with morality and mono-symptomatic approach to mental ill-
ness has been justly criticized. He is inclined to think that the Ameri-
can Law Institute rule is a better statement than Durham, if for no
other reason than its recognition that criminal responsibility is not a dis-
crete entity, but rather an essentially arbitrary point on a continuum,
as reflected in the ALI rule's "deprived of substantial capacity"
phraseology. Also, diminished capacity adds a useful dimension to
the rule, which may provide a more sensitive means of identifying par-
tial impairments such as mental retardation. 1' However, all these rules
proceed from the same, essentially erroneous, premises: that "insanity"
(or, more accurately, want of criminal responsibility) is something that
can be described in testimony and found by juries; and that labeling
one "sane" or "insane" in the course of a criminal trial is a function
useful enough to justify the investment of all but a fraction' 2 of the
very limited behavioral science resources now devoted to the criminal
justice system. It is believed that Brawner is not the last act in the
drama. Perhaps the ultimate "improvement" in the insanity rule
will be to abolish it altogether. But more about that later.
The Brawner decision had been under consideration by the Court
of Appeals for more than a year prior to its announcement late in June,
1972. At the request of the court, briefs amici curiae were filed by a
number of individuals and organizations (unhappily not including
Monte Durham, who for many years has been proudly telling visitors to
St. Elizabeths Hospital about "his" rule). The author will leave to
his colleagues discussion of the facts in the case and the specifics of the
expert testimony, preferring to comment briefly on the recommenda-
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. IV, 1971), apparently restoring mandatory
commitment, and requiring that "insanity" be affirmatively established by a preponder-
ance of e-vidence.
11. See Allen, The Retarded Offender: Unrecognized in Court and Untreated in
Pison, 32 FED. PROBATION 22 (1968).
12. John Suarez, M.D., of the U.C.L.A. Neuropsychiatric Institute, estimates it at
upwards of ninety percent. Psychiatric News, August 16, 1972.
Vol. 1973:671
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tions made by the amici-a distinguished group, including the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association,
American Civil Liberties Union, National Legal Aid and Defender As-
sociation, National District Attorneys Association, Public Defender Serv-
ice and the Bar Association of the District of Columbia. Indeed, the
significance of the Brawner decision may lie less in the rule adopted
(which, after all, merely allies the District of Columbia circuit with all
the other federal circuits save one) than in the thoughtfully considered
analyses contributed by these experts from a variety of disciplines. Fol-
lowing a discussion of the recommendations made by the amici con-
cerning the insanity defense and issues surrounding it, the author will
consider a proposal rejected by the Brawner court: abolition of the in-
sanity defense.
THE BRIEFS AMIdc
On the Insanity Defense.
The options considered by the court, on which comment was invited
from the amici, were: reaffirmation of Durham (or Durham as modi-
fied by Carter, McDonald and Washington); return to M'Naghten;
adoption of Judge Bazelon's suggestion in a recent case that the defend-
ant should be exculpated if the jury finds that his behavioral controls
were impaired to such an extent "that he cannot justly be held respon-
sible";13 enlargement of the Durham "mental disease or defect" lan-
guage to include socio-economic strictures on behavior; adoption of the
ALI rule (or one of its variants 4); and abolition of the insanity de-
fense.' 5
13. United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Cf. REPORT Or
ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPrrAL PuNIsHMENT 333 (1953), which recommends that the
jury be instructed to determine whether, in light of defendant's mental condition, he
"ought not to be held responsible."
14. See, e.g., Judge Biggs' thoughtful opinion in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d
751 (3d Cir. 1961).
15. Coincidentally, the result was announced just six days before the United States
Supreme Court issued its 118 pages of opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 912
(1972), striking down imposition of the death penalty as a cruel and unusual punish-
ment, violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments, in four cases before the
Court, and at least casting doubt on the propriety of capital punishment in future cases.
Although not all insanity cases have involved capital charges (e.g., Monte Durham
was accused of housebreaking), a high enough proportion of the defendants raising that
defense were facing a possible death sentence that it is reasonable to assume that the
Supreme Court's ruling-fraught with uncertainty as it is-will substantially reduce in-
cidence of the plea.
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As to the various competing "tests," the amici were, understandably,
divided. In fact, only four (National District Attorneys Association,
Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia, American Psychia-
tric Association, and appellee) urged adoption of the ALI rule. But
the listing is misleading, since none of the four recommended as its first
choice the rule ultimately adopted by the Court of Appeals: the
NDAA's vigorously expressed first choice was abolition; the Public De-
fender Service apparently recommended Judge Biggs' Third Circuit
Court of Appeals variant; 16 the APA indicated its disapproval of Wash-
ington (which imposed restrictions on psychiatric testimony); and ap-
pellee (prosecution) had objections to diminished responsibility. Three
briefs expressly objected to the ALI rule (the District of Columbia
Bar Association, and the briefs of David L. Chambers, m, and William
H. Dempsey, Jr., amicus by designation of the court).
Five amicus briefs supported Durham-though again with varia-
tions. Appellant (defendant) would combine ALI with Durham-
McDonald. The District of Columbia Bar Association, American Ci-
vil Liberties Union, and Dempsey briefs all recommended changing
the "product of' formulation: the Bar Association would change it to
"has a relationship to"; 7 ACLU to "substantial connection";"8 and
Dempsey to a formulation similar to United States v. Eichberg.19 The
American Psychological Association, characterizing Durham as a
"tyranny of psychiatric experts," would substitute for "mental disease
or defect" the phrase "mental disability or defect," defined to include
disabilities resulting from "social or emotional causes."2  Only two of
the other amici recommended enlarging the insanity defense to in-
clude socio-cultural impairments (Public Defender Service and Cham-
Perhaps the most significant inhibiting factor in non-capital cases is the relatively
longer period of confinement, generally, of persons found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity than of those found guilty of identical crimes and sentenced to prison. How-
ever, there is widespread resistance to the "sick" role by persons accused of crime-
even where the death penalty may be imposed. See Halleck, The Criminal's Problem
with Psychiatiy, 23 PSYCHIATRY: JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL PROC-
EssEs 409 (1960), reprinted in R. ALLEN, E. FERsTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW
AND PsYcmA'TRY 43-46 (1968).
16. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
17. Brief for the Bar Association of the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae at 9.
18. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Fund of the National Capital Area as
Amicus Curiae at 20.
19. 439 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
20. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amincus Curiae at 13-14.
Vol. 1973:67]
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bers); three expressly opposed such extension (American Psychiatric
Association, appellee, and Dempsey).
Abolition of the insanity defense was advocated by the National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association in a lengthy discussion covering some
twenty-six pages of its brief, with psychiatric evidence to be admissible
only on the defendant's mental capacity to have the mens rea required
for the crime with which he is charged. Both the American Psy-
chiatric Association and the Chambers brief spoke favorably of abo-
lition,21 but their views were quite different from those of the district
attorneys, since both emphasized the necessity of introducing psychia-
tric resources into the sentencing and correctional processes. Chambers,
for example, observes:
The Durham experiment, however valuable it has been for sharpening
the debate on criminal responsibility. . . may. . . have served to de-
flect attention from the necessity of creating-as California has created-
extensive psychiatric facilities within the prison system. It may then be
time for the court to undertake the ultimate experiment-abandoning
the defense altogether and building a humane and effective system of
criminal corrections. 22
The American Psychiatric Association cited the 1929 joint position
statement of the APA and the American Bar Association, advocating:
1. That there be available to every criminal and juvenile court a psy-
chiatric service to assist the court in the disposition of offenders.
2. That no criminal be sentenced for any felony in any case in which
the judge has any discretion as to the sentence until there be filed as
a part of the record a psychiatric report.
3. That there be a psychiatric service available to each penal and cor-
rectional institution.
4. That there be a psychiatric report on every prisoner convicted of a
felony before he is released.
5. That there be established in every state a complete system of ad-
ministrative transfer and parole and that there be no decision for or
against any parole or any transfer from one institution to another
without a psychiatric report.2 3
21. National Legal Aid and Defender Association also disapproved of all ex-
tant tests of criminal responsibility (on the ground that they discriminate against the
poor), but did not expressly advocate abolition-or indeed any other alternative.
22. Brief of Prof. David L. Chambers, m, as Amicus Curiae at 35.
23. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 26.
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Amicus added, somewhat wistfully, that it "hopes that these principles
someday may be implemented. '2
On Psychological Testimony
Another issue on appeal, closely related to that of the insanity de-
fense, was the propriety of the prosecutor's efforts to discredit the testi-
mony of a St. Elizabeths psychologist who had testified concerning the
results of projective tests he had administered to the defendant, in
part by doing a little testifying himself in cross-examination and in his
closing argument. For example, he told the jury in summation:
Ladies and gentlemen, then we come to that ink blot. . . . Fourteen
responses and four of them turn out to be anatomical things-hearts
or whatever it happened to be. Is there something unusual about
that? Is a man crazy when he sees a heart or something else four
times ...? After all, they are just blots of ink. Is a man crazy when
he sees them? And how about that last one, that rocket one. He says
he sees a rocket going off. I asked him, doctor, was there any rocket
fired during that period of time that might stick in a man's brain and
might suggest it to him? The doctor doesn't know. But there is some-
thing explosive about a personality if he sees a rocket on a little ink
blot.
Well, ladies and gentlemen, there is not much I can say about that; I
am not an expert. . . . But I can say one thing; that it is a jury deci-
sion. It is your province. It is your function to take that evidence and
weigh that evidence and decide whether what that doctor said as far
as you are concerned made any sense at all.25
The American Psychological Association, as might have been ex-
pected, was most vehement in its denunciation of the prosecutor's tac-
tics; William H. Dempsey, Jr., in his amicus brief, also criticized the
prosecution:
In the case at bar . . . the gravest damage to the defense was worked
through the prosecutor's cross-examination of the clinical psychologist
and his closing argument. The thrust of the questions and argument was
that either the psychological tests were unreliable or that the expert did
not know how to administer them, or both. But there is nothing in the
record to support either point. Indeed, the government evidently
employs such tests itself when the results are favorable .... 26
24. Id. at 27.
25. Record at 36, United States v. Brawmer, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
26. Brief of ilHiam H. Dempsey, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 8.
Vol. 1973:67]
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Among the other amici, only the American Psychiatric Association
commented at length about the question of the psychologist's treat-
ment at the hands of the prosecutor, but its remarks suggest that it was
more interested in attacking the psychologist than in reproving the pros-
ecutor:
[Pisychologists are not trained in medicine, are not doctors of medi-
cine, and on the basis of psychological testing alone should not be per-
mitted to testify as to a specific diagnosis of a mental disease or defect
and to relate the alleged criminal act to that disease or defect. The fi-
nal diagnosis and the relation of the disease to productive acts is a com-
plicated scientific medical and psychiatric problem. Laymen should
not be permitted to testify as the final expert in diagnosing medical
mental illnesses or defects, and certainly are not qualified to relate spe-
cific acts on a productivity basis to these medical problems2T
While some of the phrases in the paragraph quoted above are far from
clear,"' the Association's ultimate objective is quitq clear: reversal
of Judge Bazelon's decision in Jenkins v. United States,20 which held
that, assuming proper qualification,"° a psychologist may state his clin-
ical findings and opinions. In that case, too, the American Psychiatric
Association had filed a brief amicus curiae, to very much the same ef-
fect as the quotation above, if in somewhat less sophisticated terms;
viz.,
Psychology basically deals with philosophy. Psychologists study philos-
ophy, not medicine. . . and have Ph.D. degrees, i.e., Doctors of Philos-
ophy .... 31
Observing that "... there was neither testimony adduced on cross-
examination, nor testimony of a prosecutor's witness, to support a dis-
27. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 20.
28. E.g., what does "final expert" mean-would the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion require that psychological evidence be admitted only as ancillary to psychiatric
testimony, or would it bar psychological testimony as to diagnosis and "productivity"
altogether? Also, what are "medical mental illnesses or defects," since both psychia-
trists and psychologists-and, indeed, other mental health professionals and para-pro-
fessionals-purport to treat functional mental illness.
29. 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
30. Id. at 645. "The determination of a psychologist's competence to render an
expert opinion based on his findings as to the presence or absence of mental disease or
defect must depend upon the nature and extent of his knowledge. It does not depend
upon his claim to the title 'psychologist."'
31. The briefs of both the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association are excerpted in R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & J. RUBIN, supra
note 15, at 160-74.
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paragement of the very concept of projective tests, as based on mere
ink blots," the Court of Appeals in Brawner criticized the prosecutor's
questioning and summation as a "know-nothing appeal to ignorance,"
adding the veiled threat that it is "an approach we do not expect to re-
cur." However, it did not find it so persistent and aggravated as to
result in reversible error (perhaps because of the judge's "clarifying ques-
tions," or the fact that defense counsel failed to object). 32  Interest-
ingly, just two months prior to the decision in Brawner, the court had
to deal with a somewhat similar judicial disparagement of psychologi-
cal testing. In United States v. Alexander & Murdock,33 the trial judge
took over the questioning of the clinical psychologist testifying for the
defense:
Witness: On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, it
is a series of 500 or so true and false statements which
have been standarized against people with known mental
symptoms and complaints. There are various patterns,
profiles we call them, based on the way an individual re-
sponds. Mr. Murdock's pattern of responses is very
similar to standardized groups of people who are known
to have-known to be sullen, known to be alienated,
known to be a kind of loner, not being identified with
any of the establishment's kinds of views.
The Court: That is an opinion.
Witness: No, I am telling you a fact.
The Court: I beg your pardon, Doctor. That is an opinion. Give
them the facts on which you reached that opinion. What
answers did he give you that led you to that opinion?
Give us some examples of sullen answers to questions.
Witness: I don't have the raw-the actual MMPI which I want to
talk about. I have the summary sheet. I don't have the
actual 568 questions. I have his responses, but I don't
know what the actual questions were. . . . I do have
the results of other tests which I perhaps ....
The Court: Mr. Witness, you are entitled to those opinions, but you
are not the judge. The jury is the judge of the facts and,
therefore, you are required to explain to the jury in factual
32. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. King v.
United States, 372 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
33. 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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terms ...what the underlying material is from which
you reach your opinion, because the jury is not required
to accept the opinion of any expert and they have to weigh
the testimony of experts and to do that they need to know
what it is that the expert relied on to reach his conclu-
sion.3 4
Concluding that the witness's answers were unsatisfactory, the court
ruled that his testimony was entitled to no weight, and instructed the
jury to disregard it, and Murdock's counsel moved for a mistrial.
The Court of Appeals did not rule squarely on the propriety of the
judge's questioning or on his instruction to the jury to disregard the
psychologist's testimony, but affirmed the conviction and described the
situation as a "failure of communication ending in evident mutual ex-
asperation."3 5 Judge Bazelon in his dissent observed:
It would have been perfectly appropriate to question Dr. Blum further
about the precision of his tests, the margin of error in their results, and
the significance of his findings in this particular case. He might well
have been asked how closely Murdock's responses matched the stand-
ard profile on which Dr. Blum based his evaluation-whether Murdock
fit squarely in a standard category or whether the psychological evalua-
tion was more tentative. By asking exclusively for specific test re-
sponses, which would add little to the jury's understanding of the ex-
pert's opinion, the trial judge may have inadvertently cut off the flow of
information about the statistical nature of the tests, information with-
out which the jury could not evaluate Dr. Blum's opinion testimony. 0
This is, of course, a more charitable characterization than the "know-
nothing appeal to ignorance" charge leveled against the prosecutor in
Brawner, but it may amount to very much the same thing.37
Judge Bazelon concluded his dissent in Murdock with this appraisal
of psychological testimony:
The problem of dealing effectively with testimony based on psychologi-
cal tests is not a new one for this court. We have frequently seen at-
torneys and judges elicit from a psychologist a series of test questions
and answers, thereby setting up an easy target for ridicule. It would
be inappropriate to shield these tests from scrutiny by prohibiting such
questions. . . . Indeed, it may be that the validity of the tests is so
34. Id. at 953-54.
35. Id. at 967.
36. Id. at 955.
37. See the instructive monograph by David Silber, Ph.D., Clinical Psychology-Its
Role and Methods, in R. ALLEN, E. FETRsrR & J. RumN, supra note 15, at 83-92.
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doubtful that they should be excluded from evidence as a matter of law.
But if courts are willing to accept the tests as legitimate diagnostic tools,
it is troublesome to see counsel or the court attempting to discredit
them in a particular case by ridicule, rather than exploring their ac-
knowledged strengths and weaknesses.33
On Psychiatric Testimony-and the Role of the Public Mental Hospital
The brief of Professor David L. Chambers, I, of the University
of Michigan School of Law, was devoted almost exclusively to St. Eliza-
beths Hospital, the principal public mental hospital in the District of Co-
lumbia, and its staff psychiatrists, who testify in nearly all cases in which
the insanity defense is raised. Chambers insisted that:
Several versions of the insanity defense are under consideration in this
case. The purpose of this brief is to suggest that much more is needed
than a reformulation of the test before the defense can operate in this
jurisdiction in a manner that will provide a fair hearing to defendants
raising the defense and that will serve satisfactorily the functions we en-
vision for the insanity defense, specifically, the diagnostic process at St.
Elizabeths Hospital needs to be greatly improved. . . . If, how-
ever, the Court fails to take such steps or help to see that they are taken,
I fear that it will make little difference which version of the insanity de-
fense it chooses to adopt.39
Professor Chambers conducted an empirical study at St. Elizabeths
Hospital's John Howard Pavilion (the ward for criminally committed
patients) for the National Institute of Mental Health in 1969, and at
various points in the brief he drew upon the findings of that study. It
is a brief that deserves wider circulation, for much of what is said of
St. Elizabeths Hospital is equally applicable to any large state facility
for the "criminally insane."
Among the points made by Professor Chambers are the following:
1. There are too many patients and too few psychiatrists (in 1969,
John Howard Pavilion had 370 patients and four psychiatrists, with
referrals of 450 defendants charged with felonies each year on sixty-
day observation orders), with little in the way of real "observation"
since the average patient stays over sixty days and sees a doctor only
twice.
2. There is a diagnostic "conflict of interest," in that defendants
raising the insanity defense are examined at John Howard Pavilion, and
38. United States v. Alexander & Murdock, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
39. Brief of Prof. David L. Chambers, HI, as Amicus Curiae at 3.
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if found not guilty by reason of insanity, are returned to John Howard
Pavilion for treatment. "The doctors at St. Elizabeths, knowing that
a decision that a man is mentally ill may lead to his return to the hos-
pital, may, consciously or unconsciously, decide a man is not men-
tally ill simply to insure that he is not returned to the hospital. '40 The
brief argues that due process requires that the hospital be barred from
one or the other of these functions.
3. These possibly conflicting roles of the hospital staff may also af-
fect decision-making by the judge or jury, who, even if opposing
testimony (that the defendant is "insane") is believed, may hesitate to
acquit by reason of insanity, fearing that the hospital will promptly re-
lease one whom its staff do not believe belongs there.
4. Because of the shortage of professional personnel, and the heavy
inroads on their time necessitated by frequent testifying in court,
both diagnostic evaluations and treatment suffer.
5. A significant number of those whom the St. Elizabeths staff diag-
noses as mentally ill and who are found not guilty by reason of insanity
have problems with which John Howard Pavilion is ill-equipped to deal
(e.g., the anti-social personality-formerly termed the psychopath or
sociopath); and, conversely, many criminal defendants who could
profit from hospitalization are never referred to the hospital for exam-
ination or treatment.
Like Judges Leventhal and Bazelon (see the quotes with which this
article was begun), Professor Chambers believes that the wording of
the insanity defense rule will make little difference for most defendants
-not only because of the institutional problems summarized above,
but also because in the majority of cases where the defense is raised
the issue (and hence the rule) is never submitted to a jury. A system
of bargained insanity pleas has developed, under which, if the hospital
reports that the defendant is mentally ill and that the crime was a prod-
uct of that illness, and if the defendant agrees not to contest indetermi-
nate commitment to the hospital, a perfunctory hearing is held, with a
stipulation of facts and brief testimony by a single psychiatrist, and a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered by the judge.
Chambers observes that changing the wording of the insanity rule is
hardly likely to alter a practice which offers so many advantages to the
participants:
40. Id. at 1.
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For both the judge and the prosecutor, the bargained defense serves to
conclude a case with a minimal cost in time and with a reasonable as-
surance of long-term incarceration. For the defendant, it provides an
alternative to prison. . . For defense counsel, especially appointed
counsel, it is attractive in reducing trial time and in providing the ap-
pearance of victory.4 '
Before leaving the Chambers brief, one further observation should be
noted-and it is sufficiently important to warrant quoting extensively
from the brief:
Defense counsel and attorneys from the United States Attorney's of-
fice often appear confused and ill-informed about this Court's decisions
regarding the insanity defense, about the examination process at St.
Elizabeths, and, not surprisingly, about the whole subject of mental ill-
ness .... 42
During the period that I worked at the Hospital, one fact that was partic-
ularly painful to me was how little most trial counsel appeared to under-
stand about the insanity defense and its operation. Many appeared
to regard a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity as a great victory
without regard to the probable length of time their client would spend
in the Hospital and without regard to the probable effect of long-
term hospitalization on their client. Few provided any information to
the Hospital during their client's stay despite the fact that the informa-
tion that had led them to move for their client's examination might have
proved helpful to their client if conveyed to the doctors. Many failed
to interview Hospital doctors whom they planned to call at trial until
the morning of the trial. This fact was doubly tragic because the Hos-
pital staff, within the confines of their schedules, seemed to me uni-
formly willing to give freely of their time to explain to counsel what they
were prepared to say, and help counsel understand their client's prob-
lem .... 43
On the basis of more than a dozen years of practice, teaching and re-
search in this bizarre, left-field business of law and psychiatry, the au-
thor of the present article must regretfully note that the same observa-
tions could have been made of any jurisdiction in the country.
ABOLITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Over a hundred years ago, a distinguished lawyer declared that the
legislatures should "amend the law so as to require the question of in-
41. Id. at 31.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Id. at 25.
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sanity to be determined by a competent tribunal after a conviction of
the fact of guilt." He urged that the instruction to the jury should
not be "'was the defendant capable of judging between right and
wrong,' a proposition which no jury can determine, but 'did he . . .
commit the specific act charged,' for whether he committed it sane or
insane, the result is . . . that the safety of society requires that he
should be placed in seclusion for such a period as will promote the
joint ends of personal reformation and the preservation of the well
being of the community at large.""
How modem and enlightened the words sound, even today! How
eminently sensible to bring to an end the labeling process that has oc-
cupied nearly all the attention of specialists in both law and the be-
havioral sciences, and get to the potentially far more fruitful business of
protection of society and reformation of the offender, which is, of
course, the raison d'gtre of the criminal law. The idea sounds new
even today, because, except for three abortive efforts several decades
ago,4 5 it has never been tried. The author recalls that when Dr. Cam-
eron-then Superintendent of St. Elizabeths Hospital-propounded it
in testimony before Senator Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee in the early 1960's, it was
headline news in the Washington Post, which described it as "dar-
ingly innovative."
In the last few years, the proposal has gained powerful adherents:
Karl Menninger,16 Sheldon Glueck,4 7 Seymour Halleck, 4 and Norval
Morris, 9 to name a few. 5° The author's colleague at the National Law
Center, Professor David Robinson, in his Consultant's Report to the
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, offered sev-
44. F. WHARTON & M. STILL9, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCB § 277, at 290 (2d ed. 1860).
45. Washington, Louisiana and Mississippi. In all three, the highest court of the
state declared abolition of the insanity defense unconstitutional. State v. Lange, 168
La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931);
State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). This prompted both the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association and Dempsey to declare in their briefs amici that a
constitutional amendment would be required; the Court in Brawner observed that in
any event abolition could not be accomplished by "judicial fiat."
46. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1969).
47. S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? (1962).
48. S. HALLECK, PsYcmATRY AID THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME (1967).
49. Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 514
(1968).
50. See also Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72
YALE L.J. 873 (1963).
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eral cogent arguments for abolition, which may be summarized as fol-
lows:51
1. Trained mental health personnel-especially psychiatrists-are in
critically short supply. Devoting their services to assistance in dis-
position and in treatment of people who need treatment, "seems far
more sensible than encouraging their presence in courthouses so that
they will be available to engage in retrospective reconstructions
of criminal responsibility."
2. All of the prevailing insanity tests are vague, and perhaps meaning-
less, inviting "semantic jousting, metaphysical speculations, [and]
intuitive moral judgments in the guise of factual determinations."
3. None of them offers much in the way of a guide to determining
either "blameworthiness" or the infinitely more important question
whether an offender ought to be institutionalized, and if so where
and with what rehabilitative program.
4. The criteria for release of persons committed after a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity are imprecise, and their application is
erratic and often oppressive.
5. It makes good therapeutic sense to treat deviants as responsible for
their conduct rather than as helpless victims of their "sickness."
6. The insanity defense fails to recognize the influences of social fac-
tors in restricting behavioral choices (e.g., the offender suffering
from delusions is exculpated, but the offender suffering from a
ghetto environment and a delinquent sub-culture is not).
7. The defense overlaps with the mens rea requirement, and neither
can be used effectively to determine dangerousness or need for
treatment.
His recommendation was rejected by the Commission-as the idea has
nearly always been rejected-with reluctance. And although it was re-
jected again in Bravner, the Court of Appeals has indicated that it is
still under consideration. In Washington the court observed:
[Ilt may be that psychiatry and the other social and behavioral sciences
cannot provide sufficient data relevant to a determination of criminal
responsibility no matter what our rules of evidence are. If so, we may
be forced to eliminate the insanity defense altogether, or refashion it in a
way which is not tied so tightly to the medical model.52
And in Murdock:
51. 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws 229 et seq. (1970).
52. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 457 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Under each of the prevailing tests of criminal responsibility, the opera-
tion of the defense has been haphazard, perfunctory, and virtually inex-
plicable. If we cannot overcome the irrational operation of the de-
fense, we may have no honest choice but to abandon it and hold all per-
sons criminally responsible for their action."
The defense of insanity is perhaps the most overwritten area in the
law. It is really difficult to say anything new about it. As has been
indicated, the proposal for abolition-novel as it may sound-has
been around for a hundred years, and the arguments for and against
have been so often stated that one has a feeling of ddjt vu in discuss-
ing contemporary writings on the subject. But let us review the
principal arguments against abolition:
1. The behavioral sciences have not advanced far enough to pro-
vide answers to such questions as moral culpability, dangerousness and
treatability."4 But if we are awaiting a scientific breakthrough on ques-
tions of moral blameworthiness, we will doubtless still be waiting on
Judgment Day (when, presumably, the only authoritative decision on
that score will be issued). And surely the treatment and release de-
cision can more appropriately be made-despite the primitive state of
our knowledge-after expert study and diagnosis of the offender, rather
than by a legislature's prospective judgment, based on a description
of a piece of behavior ("anybody who does this . . . gets that"), or
through our present system of sentencing, prison and parole (which, as
indicated by the statistics on recidivism, often works against both pro-
tection and rehabilitation).
2. The deterrent impact of the criminal law would be weakened.;
But the reverse is true. It is the present haphazard and discrimina-
tory insanity defense, postponing punishment for some, and avoiding
it for others (who "couldn't help" what they did), which weakens
the deterrent value of law.
3. It would obscure the "real issues." In a recent article a psychia-
trist observes:
Prosecutors often distort the real issues involved in the determination of
criminal responsibility. In each case in which the author has testi-
fied, for example, she has been asked on cross-examination by the pros-
53. United States v. Alexander & Murdock, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. See, e.g., Judge Haynesworth's opinion in United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1968).
55. See Erickson, Psychiatry and the Law: An Attempt at Synthesis, 1961 DurKs
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ecution (or directly by the court) some question about "treatability,"
that is, what disposition could be made of the allegedly insane defend-
ant.56
But is not prognosis a "real issue"? Have we become so wrapped up
in the game of labeling defendants "sane" or "insane" that we have lost
sight of its purposes? Or perhaps it is indeed a game: "Do not
pass go, do not collect $200."
4. "[IE]liminating the insanity defense would remove from the
criminal law and the public conscience the vitally important distinc-
tion between illness and evil .... .57 To which the author can only
comment: "Right on!" The dichotomy which the law has tried to
maintain between the "mad" and the "bad" is a patent absurdity, whose
loss will be little missed, save by professional testifiers and psychia-
trist-baiting cross-examiners.
Perhaps the most telling objection to continuation of the quest for
separation of the "sane" from the "insane" is that humanity just is not
divisible into such discrete categories. If the elusive group we are
seeking to define with our reformulations of rules are those without
"free will"-without the capacity to choose to obey the rules of society
-then where are they to be found? And how? The "sickest" of
us, in the most remote back ward of a primitive state hospital, have
some capacity to respond to rules, some consciousness of moral ac-
countability (indeed, for some it is inability to deal with an overwhelm-
ing sense of guilt and unworthiness which has resulted in their need for
hospitalization). And the "wellest" of us have areas of ego weakness,
in which our range of behavioral choices is narrowed by our heredi-
tary equipment and our experiences. If those we are trying to iden-
tify are the "treatables"-those who can benefit from mental health
care-then we are simply not asking the right questions. How in any
event can a lay jury be expected, on the basis of a few days or weeks of
trial, to make a diagnosis and prescription of treatment--especially
when the information on which it must act is filtered through the mech-
anisms of adversary inquiry, often focused on moral blameworthiness?
Once the label is applied-"sick" or "well," "responsible" or "in-
sane"-who is benefited? A dear friend of the author, Dr. Seymour
56. Gray, The Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Rele-
vance, 10 AM. CIuM. L.Q. 559 (1972).
57. A, GOLDSTEIN, Tr INSANITY DEFENSE 223 (1967).
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Pollack, appeared last year as a guest speaker in the author's Crim-
inal Law and Procedure class, and told us about his experience in the
Sirhan Sirhan case. Pollack appeared as a witness for the prosecu-
tion, and Dr. Bernard Diamond, also an eminent California forensic
psychiatrist, appeared for the defense. Both made heroic investments
of time-literally hundreds of hours of clinical interviewing, examina-
tion of reports and documents, conference with counsel, and testify-
ing in court. To what end? Was society one whit better protected by
it all? Was Sirhan Sirhan's condition-whatever it may be-improved
in the slightest degree? We enjoyed the discussion of the case, and I
think the students learned something from our analysis of the direct
and cross-examination of these extraordinarily well-qualified experts.
But I for one could not help but think how much more productive
would have been the devotion of their considerable talents to something
like providing consultation services to probation officers, setting up
group therapy programs in correctional institutions, or establishing half-
way houses for the vast majority of offenders, who cannot profit
from-and indeed will be harmed by-incarceration in a prison.
The author's first collaborator in teaching law and psychiatry at the
Menninger School of Psychiatry, Dr. Joseph Satten, put it this way:
[The psychiatrist can make his greatest contribution in legal situations
if he enters after the question of guilt and innocence has been resolved
and when the only question is what to do with the individual in his own
and society's best interest. In other words, the psychiatrist can do the
most good when he remains in his clinical, treatment-oriented role."
Finally, the defense of insanity works directly against both the goals
of protection of society and reformation of the offender. As to the
former, since the defense is just that-an affirmative defense-it may
be raised or not raised at the option of the defendant. Should not
treatment, when treatment is needed to effect behavioral change, be
a part of the armamentarium of society, along with incarceration, vo-
cational training, probation, and the other correctional tools? As
to the latter, the whole process leading to an adjudication of non-respon-
sibility may be counter-therapeutic. Is not the whole objective of ther-
apy to help the patient accept the fact that he is responsible for what he
does, and that he must take control of his life and make choices of be-
havior on reality-oriented grounds and not on fantasies? For the
58. Satten, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychiatry and Its Relationship to the
Legal Problems of "Criminal Responsibility," 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 361, 363 (1956).
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psychopath-sociopath-antisocial personality, an acquittal "by reason of
insanity" provides the one, irrefutable defense against any efforts at
behavioral change: "I can't help myself; I'm sick!" Shades of "Dear
Officer Krupke!"
This section of the article has been, perhaps, more polemical than
specific. There are problems in effecting abolition of the insanity de-
fense which demand fuller exposition. There is the problem of con-
stitutionality if the change is made by the courts or the legislatures 9
(which the author is happy to leave to other scholars). And there is the
problem of mens rea. Many of the substantive offenses are statutorily
defined in terms of mental state (like malice aforethought, deliberately
and premeditatedly, willfully, maliciously, with intent to . . . , etc.),
and each may well involve the kind of intra-psychic foray now conducted
under the rubric of the insanity rule (as California has discovered under
its bifurcated trial system). And there is also the problem of the stigma
and deprivation of civil and jural rights which now follows a criminal
conviction. Perhaps the only way effectively to abolish the insanity
defense is to abolish as well the moral condemnation of the criminal law,
substituting for it a simple process of adjudicating the operative facts
of guilt.
But, most important of all, if the defense of insanity is removed,
something must be put in its place. And it is on this point that the brief
of the National District Attorneys Association is deficient. The es-
sential quid pro quo, in the author's opinion, is establishment of a
real system of corrections, with differential treatment modalities geared
to individual needs and capabilities, and not to reified labels. A
system primarily community-based is needed, instead of the fortress-
like prisons and "hospitals" (often differing from prisons only in that
the guards wear white coats) of the present criminal justice system.
The. e is, of course, a danger in all this-that of developing a Clock-
work Orange-like therapeutic state. The author recognizes the prob-
lem-it is real, but not insoluble. If the present system of determin-
ing "insanity" is to be abandoned for one in which triers of fact de-
cide only the factual questions of who did what to whom, and whether
the thing done is proscribed by law, and whether the whole process of
proof conforms to due process safeguards, and in which the dis-
position decision is made after trial, by a more expert tribunal, after
59. See note 45 supra.
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more intensive study than can be provided via the trial process, then
that decision too must accord that elemental fairness subsumed in the
phrase "due process of law." There must be provision for notice, repre-
sentation, a right to independent evaluation, hearing, and judicial re-
view. And perhaps there should also be membership on the disposi-
tional panel of judges and lawyers as well as behavioral scientists,
for their decisions involve social and legal, as well as medical and psy-
chological, considerations.
A society must decide where it will spend its limited chips. If the
optimal treatment for a given offender is one-to-one psychotherapy
three times a week for a period of years, society has, it would seem,
the right to say that it would prefer to devote its resources to other
things (say, school mental health programs), and to take its chances
with more traditional handling of the offender. Again, if "dangerous-
ness," or the likelihood of repetition of the offense were the only cri-
teria for release, most first degree murderers would be back on the
streets within a few months, and most exhibitionists would be incar-
cerated (in hospital or prison) for life. But there is a social interest
at stake, and perhaps the deterrence objective of the criminal law makes
necessary some period of punitive custody for an offense as serious
as murder; and perhaps society must accept the risk that the exhibition-
ist will repeat his offense under some future stress, if the only alterna-
tive is life imprisonment.
POSTLUDE
This article was subtitled: "New Lyrics for an Old Tune." The
words of the Brawnedr rule are somewhat less ambiguous than those of
Durham-McDonald-somewhat more in accord with what we know
about human personality, but the tune is still the same and it is dis-
cordant, out of harmony with the objectives of the criminal law.
Psychiatrists used to be called "alienists," and those whom they treated
were regarded as "alien"-to be identified, separated from the "sane"
and shuttled off to some remote, secure place. Whatever ultimately
happens to the insanity rule-whether it is refined, substituted for,
or scrapped-what happens to the mentally impaired offender is of
infinitely greater importance. The Roman poet Terence said it simply
and well: "I am a human being . . .and nothing that is human is alien
to me."
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